












between	banks	and	borrowers,	 etc.	This	characteristic	of	 credit	 ameliorates	 the	problems	 stemming	 from	
information	friction	and	facilitates	 the	 flow	of	 funds	 into	macroeconomic	activities.	 In	 the	credit	view	it	 is,	
therefore,	argued	that	credit	has	an	important	influence	on	the	macroeconomy.	I	provide	a	schematic	diagram	of	the	
credit	view	in	Figure	1.	







2.  Credit and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism
	 In	the	money	view,	the	conventional	view	of	the	monetary	transmission	mechanism,	it	has	been	asserted	that	
monetary	policy	exerts	 its	 influence	on	real	economic	activity	 through	changing	 the	money	supply	and	 thus	


























example,	Bernanke	and	Blinder	[1992],	Gertler	and	Gilchrist	[1993,	1994],	Kashyap	et al.	 [1993],	Hoshi	et al.	
[1993]).	










3.  Credit and the Propagation Mechanism of Economic Fluctuations
	 Placing	emphasis	on	the	macroeconomic	role	of	credit,	in	the	general	spirit	of	the	credit	view,	has	also	been	
done	in	order	to	explore	the	possible	links	between	credit	and	economic	fluctuations.	Two	hypotheses,	the	financial	
















3.1.  The Financial Accelerator Hypothesis













especially	economic	downturns––	 than	 their	counterparts	––	 large	or	mature	firms.	This	 feature	 is	presented	
theoretically	by	Holmstrom	and	Tirole	(1997)	and	supported	by	a	wide	range	of	empirical	work	(see,	for	example,	
Gertler	and	Gilchrist	[1994],	and	Kashyap	et al.	[1994]).	Second,	the	financial	accelerator	effects	are	asymmetric.	
This	means	 that	 the	 impact	of	changes	 in	borrowers’	net	worth	on	 the	 real	economy	 is	more	substantial	 in	


















availability	 in	both	good	and	crisis	 times	but	effects	are	even	stronger	 in	 the	latter	period.	In	other	words,	 the	





3.2.  The Capital Crunch Hypothesis
	 While	the	financial	accelerator	hypothesis	focuses	on	changes	in	borrowers’	balance	sheet	condition	caused	





presented	 theoretically	by	Thakor	 (1996)	 that	when	a	bank’s	 level	of	capital	 is	 low,	 lending	will	be	 further	
diminished	by	the	regulatory	requirements	of	capital	adequacy,	since	the	bank	has	to	reduce	its	high–risk	category	
lending	in	order	to	clear	the	requirements.	Therefore,	banks'	weak	financial	positions	will	have	a	direct	negative	
impact	on	bank	 lending.	 In	 the	previous	 literature,	many	studies	provide	empirical	evidence	supporting	 this	
negative	correlation	(see,	for	example,	Bernanke	and	Lown	[1991],	Peek	and	Rosengren	[1995]).	
	 On	the	other	hand,	the	weak	financial	position	of	banks	will	also	impede	their	lending	ability	indirectly	by	
causing	a	decrease	 in	bank	deposits.	As	suggested	by	Kashyap	and	Stein	(1995),	considering	 the	 information	
asymmetry	between	a	bank	and	its	depositors,	 the	deterioration	of	the	bank’s	financial	position	will	 increase	its	






































identifying	 the	effects	of	monetary	policy	on	 loan	supply	and	 loan	demand,	Jiménez	et al.	 (2012b)	present	
empirical	results	 that	both	tighter	monetary	and	worse	economic	conditions	substantially	reduce	loan	granting,	
especially	from	banks	with	lower	capital	or	liquidity	ratios.		























	 	 	 NW	=	IF	+	p0
L･LA      	 (1)













	 At	the	beginning	of	the	period,	 just	before	the	bank	lends	to	the	entrepreneur,	 the	bank’s	balance–sheet	
constraint	is:





	 	 	 R1	+	L	=	D1	+	C1		(R1 ≧ qD1),	 	 	 	 	 (3)
and








	 Collateral Requirement:	When	lending	to	the	entrepreneur,	 the	bank	requires	the	land	possessed	by	the	







conducting	 information–acquiring	 activities	 concerning	 the	 entrepreneur,	 such	 as	 investigating	 his	
creditworthiness,	 evaluating	 the	profitability	of	 the	project,	monitoring	 the	 level	of	efforts	exerted	by	 the	





























　　  ＞ 0,	　　  ＜ 0,	　　  ＜ 0
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 ∂2L　　　 ∂2AS　　　∂2NW
	 The	specific	form	of	the	IC	function	is	assumed	as:
	 	 	 IC	=	a1L
2	–	a2AS
2	–	a3NW











	 The Interest Rate on Safe Assets:	The	riskless	 interest	 rate	 (r),	a	proxy	for	monetary	policy,	 is	given	
exogenously.	As	a	result,	 the	opportunity	costs	of	the	bank’s	lending	to	the	entrepreneur	––	in	other	words,	 the	
return	from	investing	the	same	amount	as	L	in	safe	assets	––	is	(1+r)L.
	 Based	on	the	above	set	of	assumptions,	I	describe	the bank’s incentive–compatible constraint	as	follows:	
	 	 	 ps	(1	+	rL)	L	+	p
f E	[p1
L･LA]	–	IC ≧ (1	+	r)	L	 	 	 	 (6)
	 The	left–hand	side	of	(6)	shows	the	bank’s	expected	return	from	lending,	which	is	the	expected	return	of	the	
project	(the	sum	of	the	expected	return	if	 the	project	succeeds	and	if	 the	project	fails)	minus	the	information–
acquiring	costs.	The	 right–hand	side	 is	 the	opportunity	costs	 that	 the	bank	 incurs	when	making	 loans.	This	








































		∂L　　　　 2a2	(D0	+	C0)　　	=	　　　　　　　　　　　 	>	0	 	 	 	 	 	 (11)
	∂D0　  (1	+	r)	–	p
s	(1	+	rL)	+	2a1L




























agency	costs	 in	 this	model,	 this	result	 is	consistent	with	 the	bank	lending	channel	of	 the	financial	accelerator	
hypothesis.
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